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Post-truth and the crisis of the political 
Saul Newman 
It is difficult today to avoid the term post-truth.1 It was after all the OED word of the 
year in 2016, where it was defined as: ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which 
objective facts are less influential in shaping political debate or public opinion than 
appeals to emotion and personal belief’. That year, of course, was marked by two 
cataclysmic events that seemed to symbolise the emerging post-truth paradigm: the 
Brexit referendum in the UK and the election of Donald Trump as US president. The 
Brexit referendum was marred by egregious lies and false promises, such as the 
notorious claim that the UK sent £350 million per week to the EU, money that could 
otherwise be spent on the National Health Service. And, of course, Trump appears as 
the very embodiment of post-truth discourse and its blatant disregard for facts, 
uttering a profusion of falsehoods and downright lies (‘alternative facts’) designed, as 
demagogues always seek to do, to appeal to emotion rather than reason and to 
heighten fear and resentment rather than promote rational debate. The proliferation of 
lies from politicians, the disdain for scientific evidence and verifiable facts, the 
deliberate blurring of the line between truth and falsehood, seem to be all around us 
today. I understand post-truth as a new paradigm in politics - one that goes beyond 
mere political lying and spin (‘bullshit’) and points to the decline of the symbolic 
authority of truth itself. Truth is not transgressed so much as ignored and bypassed, 
drowned out in a cacophony of competing narratives. In so far as, as Arendt claimed, 
politics depends on a shared acknowledgement of certain factual truths, post-truth 
thus represents a crisis of political life. The post-truth condition is a post-political 
condition.  
In understanding post-truth as a symptom of post-politics, we need to explore the 
paradoxical relationship between truth and politics, locating a problematic that goes 
back to the very origins of the demos in ancient Greece: the original conflict between 
the singular truth of the philosopher and the affairs and concerns of the polis. Here I 
will draw on two different approaches to this problem: Hannah Arendt’s discussion of 
the conflicting, and yet inextricable, relationship between the stability of truth and the 
contingency and plurality of political life; and Michel Foucault’s exploration of 
parrësia or ‘frank speech’ – a form of truth-speaking which, while often in conflict 
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with the polis, is also necessary for any notion of ethical conduct in political life. Both 
approaches suggest that politics bears some essential relation to truth, even if truth 
often finds itself impotent in the face of mere opinion. Yet, while there is some 
question about the efficacy today, in the current post-truth condition, of asserting facts 
against lies or ‘speaking truth to power’, I argue that there is something valuable in 
Foucault’s idea of truth speaking as a form of ethical (and also political) 
subjectivation. Perhaps the only way in which the seductions of post-truth discourse 
can be countered is not through a return to some Enlightenment idea of a universally 
valid truth, but rather through different modes of subjectivity in which a certain 
relation to truth becomes an ethical and political matter of caring for oneself and for 
others. 
Defining post-truth 
The propagation of falsehoods, lies and misinformation appears to have become one 
of the defining features of political discourse today. Barely a day goes by without a 
tweet, comment or media release from the president of the US that, putting it 
generously, plays fast and loose with the truth – varying between outrageous 
exaggeration and distortions of reality to actually concocting facts and events.2 When 
Trump lied about the size of crowds at his inauguration, despite photographic 
evidence to the contrary, or when he invented a story of a terrorist attack in Sweden, 
or when he said what he clearly did not say during a press conference with Putin, or, 
more recently during the mid-term elections, when he described the migrant caravan 
from Honduras as an invasion and a national emergency, sending troops to the border, 
he showed a blatant disregard for truth, for factual accuracy. What is striking is the 
complete shamelessness of these lies and manipulations, as if power today makes a 
show of its own mendacity – perhaps as a demonstration of its indifference to any 
ethical standards and norms of political discourse, and even to any external standard 
of veracity, coherence or integrity. The ultimate gesture of sovereignty is to make 
truth the plaything of power.  
Of course, Trump is not alone in this. Post-truth is part of new political paradigm 
associated with a resurgent authoritarian and nationalist populism that appears in 
many contexts, in both democracies and quasi-democracies, and which Trump, along 
with Putin and other political leaders as well as lobbyists, advisers, campaign 
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strategists, press officers, and social media trolls, are both symptoms and master 
manipulators. We think of the aforementioned lies that characterised the Leave side of 
the Brexit debate in the UK, or the involvement of shadowy companies like 
Cambridge Analytica and Russian hackers in the manipulation of elections, the 
shaping of voter preferences and the promotion of ‘fake news’. Russia is an 
interesting example of a society in which, under the current regime, post-truth has 
become so endemic that it is difficult to any longer distinguish reality from fiction. 
The proliferation of false and contradictory narratives by the Putin regime – as we 
saw for instance in the denials that Russian forces were operating in Ukraine or in the 
laughable claims that Russian agents sent to poison a defector in Salisbury were 
actually tourists with an interest in cathedrals – has the effect of creating a sort of 
cognitive dissonance, which serves as a much more effective tool of political and 
social control than the crude censorship of information. 
Post-truth takes a number of forms, like the many faces and shapes of falsehood that 
Montaigne spoke of.3 It is seen not only in the lies, falsehoods, ‘alternative facts’ and 
distortions promulgated by those in power, but in the constant attacks on the media as 
the ‘enemies of the people’. The accusations of ‘fake news’ against the mainstream 
media, for which Trump is infamous, is simply the flip side of his lies. What better 
defence against the allegation of lying than to accuse one’s opponents of doing the 
same, and to dismiss factual evidence to the contrary as ‘fake news’? What better way 
to discredit and weaken the media, which might, in a functioning democracy, serve as 
an important check on political power, than to charge them with being ‘enemies of the 
people’, with all the fascistic overtones of this statement?  
A further aspect of post-truth discourse is the distrust and hostility shown towards 
expert opinion. This is part of the self-styled populist insurgency against the 
technocratic expertise of ‘the establishment’, the liberal intellectual elite that is seen 
to hold the ordinary person in contempt. One of the striking comments made during 
the run-up to the Brexit referendum was from a government minister and key 
supporter of the Leave campaign, Michael Gove, who said, in response to warnings 
from many economists of the dire consequences of leaving the EU, that ‘people in this 
country have had enough of experts’ - reminiscent of the infamous remark allegedly 
made by the judge who, during the French Revolutionary Terror, sentenced the 
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scientist Lavoissier to the guillotine, that the Republic had no need of savants. Indeed, 
the most serious example of this contempt for expert opinion is the dismissal of 
climate science. In the face of overwhelming evidence and unanimous consensus on 
the part of the scientific community, claims about climate change and its man-made 
causes are dismissed by some political leaders, not to mention lobbyists for the fossil 
fuel industry, as a hoax. Scientific evidence is confronted with counter-narratives and 
‘alternative facts’. The effect of this is to create an atmosphere of confusion that not 
only disables political action on fossil fuel reduction, but also animates certain 
conservative political constituencies for whom the environmental agenda is felt to be 
an attack on their very identity and lifestyle.  
One of the effects of post-truth discourse is therefore to construct a certain narrative – 
which is usually pitted against the dominant ‘establishment’ narrative – around which 
particular constituencies affiliate themselves, in opposition to other constituencies; an 
effect intensified in today’s highly partisan and divided political climate. It is not 
simply a question of agreeing with a particular narrative, but rather a passionate 
attachment to it, much in the same way that, as Freud described a long time ago in his 
study of the psychodynamics of groups, there was an emotional bond or tie between 
members of a group and their leader, an attachment that proved impervious to rational 
persuasion or even to factual truth. Paraphrasing Gustav Le Bon’s description of the 
group mind, Freud says that ‘groups have never thirsted after truth. They demand 
illusions and cannot do without them.’4 Furthermore:  
Since a group is in no doubt as to what constitutes truth or error, and is 
conscious, moreover, of its own great strength, it is as intolerant as it is obedient 
to authority. It respects force and can only be slightly influenced by kindness, 
which it regards merely as a form of weakness. What it demands of its heroes is 
strength, or even violence. It wants to be ruled and oppressed and to fear its 
masters. Fundamentally it is entirely conservative, and it has a deep aversion 
from all innovations and advances and an unbounded respect for tradition.5  
So, the group – or political constituency – has no desire for the truth, but at the same 
time asserts its own truth with absolute certainty, to the exclusion of all other 
opinions. This is no doubt applicable to the post-truth condition, which is 
characterised by an odd mixture of relativism and dogmatism. Moreover, the group’s 
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obedience to the master, and its conservatism, is similar to the authoritarianism of 
right wing populism today. The groups and constituencies who support Trump and 
other populist leaders are attracted not by their moderation or respect for liberal 
values and institutions but, on the contrary, by their willingness to violate established 
norms and procedures – something that is seen as a sign of strength – and especially 
by their disregard for the truth. This is why lying is often taken as a indication of 
authenticity; why, for instance, Trump’s blatant lies in no way to tarnish his 
popularity amongst his supporters, seeming only to galvanise them, as he can be 
portrayed as either the unpolished politician who speaks up for ordinary people 
against technocratic elites, or as the sovereign who, in deciding and acting in the 
absence of facts and evidence, determines his own truth.  
If we add to this the general climate of misinformation, outlandish conspiracy theories 
– often deliberately encouraged against one’s political opponents6, but also directed 
against institutions and ‘the establishment’ in general – and the increasingly 
antagonistic and polarised views and political perspectives resounding through the 
echo chambers of the internet and social media, we see that post-truth refers to a 
much more pervasive phenomenon than mere political deceit. Where exactly does the 
difference lie, and what is new here? After all, lying has always been part of political 
life. Political philosophers going back to Plato have recognised that lies might on 
certain occasions be necessary or at least expedient. In the Republic, it will be 
recalled, Plato spoke of the need for a noble lie, a founding fiction to justify a social 
order in which only certain people, those in whom god had mixed gold in their 
person, would be allowed to rule, while the rest, those mixed with less precious 
metals, were assigned a lower place in the hierarchy. Machiavelli recommended that 
the prince be prepared to use deceit, guile and dissimulation in order to gain power 
and win support. As Arendt said, ‘no one, as far as I know, has ever counted 
truthfulness among the political virtues. Lies have always been regarded as necessary 
and justifiable tools not only of the politician’s or the demagogue’s but also of the 
statesman’s trade.’7 Statesmen and politicians have always lied, often to conceal the 
most serious abuses of power.  
So what has changed with post-truth? The difference is in the way that post-truth 
discourse no longer bothers even to pay lip service to the truth. Whereas the political 
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lie, in transgressing the truth, at the same time reaffirmed the authority of the truth, 
post-truth discourse simply ignores truth altogether and no longer bears any relation 
to it. Whereas, in the case of political lying, the discovery of the lie often led to a 
scandal of authority, in the case of post-truth there is no longer any scandal at all – 
mendacity is nakedly paraded, visible for all to see, and apparently goes unpunished. 
Truth, we can say, while violated by political lying, at the same time maintained its 
symbolic legitimacy; now this symbolic legitimacy – the idea that politicians are not 
supposed to lie, even if it is well known that they do - no longer really holds. It is not 
violated so much as relativized, eclipsed by a series of competing narratives or 
‘truths’, such that the line between truth and falsehood becomes blurred. This is what 
Trump’s advisor, Kelly-Anne Conway, was getting at when she said there were 
‘alternative facts’ in reference to Trump’s alternative version of size of the audience 
at his inauguration; or what his legal counsel, Rudy Guiliani, meant when he said that 
‘truth isn’t truth’ – that there were, in other words, competing versions of the truth. 
The idea of the one truth has now become fragmented into a series of alternative 
perspectives and positions. Nietzsche’s definition of truth as ‘a mobile army of 
metaphors, metonyms and anthropomorphisms’ has never seemed more apt.8 
The function and effect of post-truth discourse is to create a kind of cognitive 
dissonance, a general sense of confusion about what is true and false, contributing to 
an inability to accurately map our political terrain. It is a deliberate strategy of 
‘gaslighting’, aimed at the dislocation of our sense of certainty about the world. The 
subject of post-truth discourse is not so much deceived as discombobulated – 
bewildered not only by the cacophony of ‘alternative facts’ but by the audacity and 
shamelessness of a new discourse of power now fully unmoored from the normative 
standards of truth. Post-truth has to be seen as an experimentation with a new form of 
political power, one that weakens and disables opposition not by suppressing the truth 
– as in the old totalitarian regimes – but by fragmenting any sense of a shared social 
reality.  
There are, no doubt, many factors that give rise to this post-truth condition. One could 
point to, for instance, the role of ICT and social media in the circulation of 
‘alternative facts’ and conspiracy theories, in facilitating the internet echo chambers 
in which post-truth resonates, and in making it possible for companies and political 
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campaigners to employ sophisticated algorithms to identify target audiences, shape 
political constituencies and spread misinformation. It is no wonder that, for instance, 
the so-called ‘alt-right’, which came into prominence with the election of Trump and 
which revels in and echoes his racist and misogynistic rhetoric, finds its true home on 
the internet and had its origins in internet based conspiracy theory platforms. 
Furthermore, as theorists like Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi have discussed, communicative 
capitalism, and its associated technologies, permeates the psyche of the individual, 
creating cognitive dissonance and a loss of bearing, contributing to the fractured, 
permanently distracted, depressed and increasingly psychotic state of the modern 
soul9 – the perfect breeding ground for the post-truth condition. No doubt, also, the 
populist insurgency, which shows no sign of abating, has much to do with the post-
truth paradigm: the hostility towards ‘the establishment’ narrative and the discourse of 
‘political correctness’, the paranoia about the ‘global liberal elites’, popular 
resentment against immigration, and the desire for strong authoritarian leaders, all 
play into post-truth discourse and provide fertile ground for its manipulations. Related 
to this is the loss of any common horizon for politics and the fragmentation of the 
social field into antagonistic identities and ‘cultures’. Post-truth flourishes amidst 
‘culture wars’ and ideological polarisation; when people seem to live not only in 
politically opposed camps but in two utterly different universes, there is little 
possibility of forming any kind of consensus around the truth. Rather, truth becomes 
weaponized as part of a political and ideological struggle. Behind all this is a general 
breakdown in trust in political institutions, as well as in other sources of symbolic and 
epistemological authority – such as the law, the mainstream media and scientific 
discourse. We hold politicians in contempt, which is why post-truth politicians such 
as Trump can so effectively style themselves as ‘outsiders’ and ‘anti-establishment’ 
figures. From the MPs expenses scandal in the UK, to Wikileaks which exposed the 
lies behind the formal edifice of liberal democratic states, to the global financial crisis 
and the subsequent bail-out of the banks with taxpayers’ money, there has been a 
growing crisis of legitimacy in the normal sources of authority – and this has sowed 
the seeds of the post-truth phenomena. If what we once took to be the truth has been 
exposed as a lie, is it any wonder that we now seek out alternative sources of truth 
that seem to confirm our view of the world? 
Post-truth and post-politics 
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While all these factors are important, they are aspects of a broader post-political 
condition of which post-truth is symptomatic. While it might seem paradoxical and 
even counter-intuitive to talk of post-politics in the current climate of what appears to 
be intensified ideological struggle and the resurgence of populism, I think we can see 
these forces and conflicts as a reaction – a delayed one - to a decades long neoliberal 
consensus, in which the technocratic management of the economy effectively stifled 
genuine political contestation. Political theorist Wendy Brown has explored the way 
in which the market rationality of neoliberalism has led, over many years, to the 
hollowing out of the public political space and therefore to an erosion of the very 
conditions of democracy. Building on the insights of Michel Foucault, Brown 
understands neoliberalism as more than a set of economic policies promoting the idea 
of the free market, but as a practice and technique of government aimed at 
reconstituting social life and individual behaviour in the image of the market.10 More 
and more domains of social life, previously seen as autonomous from the economy, 
become marketised and monetised in various ways under neoliberalism. The very 
‘soul’ of the individual, and all human activity and interactions, are reduced to homo 
economicus and to investments in ‘human capital’. Political life becomes economised 
and reduced to the rationality of the market; public institutions and functions become 
privatised, and the idea of democracy as an autonomous space for collective self-
determination and equality is undermined and diminished.11 This produces a 
paradoxical condition of the persistence of a form of politics – or what I would 
describe as ‘post-politics’ – detached from any notion of a public space: a political 
scene, as Brown describes, ‘full of ranting and posturing, emptied of intellectual 
seriousness, pandering to an uneducated and manipulable electorate and a celebrity-
and-scandal-hungry corporate media.’12  
That our post-political world has become a grotesque post-truth carnival, a Feast of 
Fools with its elected pope in the White House, should therefore not surprise us. If all 
areas of social and political life, including democratic institutions and processes, take 
on the logic of the market, it would seem to follow that truth, once deemed essential 
to political life, even if it was more honoured in the breach than in the observance, 
becomes relativised into a series of competing ‘truth markets’.13 ‘Truths’ now have to 
compete for market share, seeing which one can garner the biggest audiences, the 
most followers on social media, or the highest TV ratings. It is no wonder that Trump, 
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a master of post-truth politics, was once a reality TV celebrity, and now seems intent 
on turning the office of the US president into a reality TV show on a grand scale, in 
which his public utterances are played for the ratings and for the approval of Fox 
News. However, this can be seen as the monstrous outcome of decades of spin, media 
management, sound bites and corporate manipulation that political life had largely 
been reduced to over the past decades. It is almost as if the simulacrum of politics has 
now taken on a life of its own, as if the mediatised spectacle now embodies a real 
flesh and blood form. In the figure of Trump, the society of the spectacle14 reaches its 
ultimate conclusion, in which fiction and reality now completely coincide.  
Truth and politics: Arendt 
The consequences of this post-truth/post-political condition are surely damaging for 
any genuine conception of politics, particularly democratic politics, which may not 
recover. But in what way does post-truth undermine political life? And what is the 
appropriate relationship between truth and politics? As we have seen, truth and 
politics have never been entirely compatible; lying has always been seen as an 
inevitable part of political life. Indeed the question of the extent to which life should 
be devoted to the pursuit of eternal truth goes to the heart of the ancient tension 
between the philosophy and politics. As the example of Socrates and his sentencing to 
death by the Athenian demos demonstrated, the philosopher’s quest for truth was seen 
as a threat to the collective life of the polis.15 Plato’s allegory of the cave, in which the 
truth-teller who, upon returning to his darkened world after escaping into the bright 
light of truth, is met only with disdain by his former fellow prisoners content to 
wallow in their own ignorance, serves as an illustration of this antagonism between 
the philosopher devoted to the truth and the citizen. Yet, if there is this basic 
antagonism between the pursuit of truth and the demands of political life, why should 
post-truth be regarded as so destructive to politics? 
For an answer to this, I turn to Hannah Arendt’s famous essay of 1967, ‘Truth and 
Politics’, in which she argued that although the eternal, singular and universal truths 
of philosophy, science and mathematics are fundamentally alien to the world of 
politics - which is characterised instead by contingency and plurality rather than 
axiomatic principles - nevertheless the very survival of this world depends at the same 
time on a mutual recognition of facts. Even though politics rests on opinion rather 
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than truth, and values a diversity of perspectives rather than a single, absolute truth, 
there needs to be a common acknowledgement of basic facts in order for debate and 
disagreement to take place. Plurality in politics thus depends on a shared ground of 
factual (as opposed to rational) truth.  
Yet, according to Arendt, not only does the philosopher’s truth no longer have any 
impact on the modern political world, but this world is increasingly hostile even to 
more mundane factual truth. While there is a greater tolerance of diverse opinions – 
religious and philosophical – ‘factual truth, if it happens to oppose a given group’s 
profit or pleasure, is greeted today with greater hostility than ever before.’16 It is not 
so much a question of the government’s suppression of the truth in the form of state 
secrets,17 but, rather, the way that certain facts, while publicly known, are disavowed 
by the public. Yet, what Arendt regards as even more troubling is the way facts are 
simply turned into opinion and carry no more weight than any other opinion. This 
relativizing of factual truth seems to foreshadow the contemporary post-truth 
condition; and in Arendt’s time, as in ours, it points to a crisis of the political. As 
Arendt says: ‘What is at stake here is this common and factual reality itself, and this is 
indeed a political problem of the first order.’18 The predicament faced by the truth 
teller today is worse than that of Plato’s enlightened former cave dweller: while the 
philosopher’s truth, by its nature, transcends worldly affairs and thus remains 
indifferent to whether or not it is accepted by others, the acceptance of factual truth 
forms the very ground of these worldly affairs. Therefore, unlike philosophical truth, 
which is singular and foreign to human affairs, factual truth, in so far as it concerns 
other people, is political by nature: ‘Facts and opinions, though they must be kept 
apart, are not antagonistic towards each other; they belong to the same realm.’19 Yet, 
while facts belong to the same world as opinions, they are not the same: opinions can 
be argued against, whereas facts are intransigent. This is why factual truths ‘are hated 
by tyrants, who rightly fear the competition of a coercive force they cannot 
monopolize, and it enjoys a rather precarious status in the eyes of governments that 
rest on consent and abhor coercion.’20 At the same time, it is their rootedness in the 
common world that makes factual truths fragile and vulnerable – even more so than 
the abstract rational truths of the philosopher. Because facts themselves are contingent 
– because they result from a random series of events and could therefore have always 
been otherwise - and because, furthermore, they depend on the often unreliable 
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testimony of witnesses, they are not self-evident. This is why, according to Arendt, it 
is easy to ‘discredit factual truth as just another opinion.’21  
What really threatens the consistency of factual truths in the modern era, according to 
Arendt, is political lying on a massive scale: the lies perpetrated, not only by 
totalitarian regimes, but also by democratic governments with their armies of 
propagandists, ‘image-makers’ and marketing consultants, whose job it is to 
manipulate public opinion through the manipulation of facts. Against these ‘hidden 
persuaders’, truth is usually powerless. Here Arendt seems, in many ways, to predict 
our contemporary post-truth condition. Modern political lies, unlike traditional 
political lies, deal with ‘things that are not secrets at all but are known to practically 
everybody.’22 In a similar sense, the lying that takes place under the post-truth 
condition is evident for all to see, yet no less effective for all that. Political lying 
therefore no longer deceives in the conventional sense but distorts our sense of reality, 
creating confusion about the world and our place within it. As Arendt says,  
the result of a consistent and total substitution of lies for factual truth is not that 
the lies will now be accepted as truth, and the truth be defamed as lies, but that 
the sense by which we take our bearings in the real world – and the category of 
truth vs. falsehood is among the mental means to this end – is being destroyed… 
Consistent lying, metaphorically speaking, pulls the ground from under our feet 
and provides no other ground on which to stand.23  
Furthermore, the reason why lying can be so effective – and here we find a further 
parallel with post-truth politics – is that when compared to the statement of a factual 
truth, which changes nothing about the world and simply supports the existing state of 
affairs, political lying, in its deliberate blurring of the line between fact and opinion, 
actually changes the existing situation and is a form of action.24 We are reminded of 
the ominous sounding rebuke once reputedly made by a senior official in the George 
W. Bush administration to a journalist, that he (the journalist) was part of a ‘reality-
based community’ of people who study the facts and derive conclusions from them. 
The official goes on to say: ‘That's not the way the world really works anymore. 
We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're 
studying that reality - judiciously, as you will - we'll act again, creating other new 
realities…’25 In inventing ‘alternative facts’, post-truth discourse creates new realities 
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in this manner – against which the insistence of factual truth is often powerless. The 
sense in which, when lying in this way, power acts to dynamically change existing 
reality, and animates certain political constituencies in doing so, is no doubt part of 
the appeal of post-truth politics. Lying is on the side of action, of the creation of a 
new insurgent political reality, whereas factual truth is on the side of ‘the 
establishment’ and represents continuity with the existing order of reality. No wonder 
factual truth seems to lack the power to mobilise people today; and no wonder that the 
purveyor of post-truth is often more persuasive. 
Yet, for Arendt, it is in the stubborn intransigence of truth, in contrast to the 
contingency of the political world – its strength in impotence - that its importance to 
the very survival of politics can be found. Indeed, the role of public institutions as 
‘refuges of truth’, outside of politics and opinion – institutions like the judiciary and 
the university – shows that the autonomy of truth with regard to power is at the same 
time essential to politics, because it provides a stable ground for our collective 
existence: ‘Conceptually, we may call truth what we cannot change; metaphorically, it 
is the ground on which we stand and the sky that stretches above us.’26  
Parrësia and truth: Foucault 
Is it sufficient, however, to rely on certain institutions as guardians of truth? How 
effective are they, in a post-truth era, in preserving an autonomous space outside 
politics and in speaking truth to power? We have seen the intense politicisation of 
judicial appointments in the US, where the Senate hearing of Judge Kavanaugh turned 
into a very spectacle of post-truth politics. More fundamentally, it is the autonomy 
and opposition of such institutions – necessary though it is – to the ‘will of the 
people’ that seems to inspire such populist rancour. Universities and judiciaries are 
often seen as the very pinnacle of the liberal establishment and its alienation from the 
lives of ordinary people. My point is not of course that such institutions are no longer 
important to a functioning democratic space – clearly they are essential, perhaps more 
so today than ever – but that they may not be enough, in themselves, to stem the post-
truth tide. Moreover, as Arendt herself acknowledges, what often renders truth 
impotent in the face of political lying is that political lying is a form of action that 
creates a new reality, whereas factual truths simply reaffirm the existing situation. 
Surely this would doubly apply to institutions of truth, which embody changeless 
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continuity. Perhaps, then, we need a new relation to truth – something that preserves 
its autonomy from the political world, but at the same time introduces a disruptive 
element into the existing political order, much in the way that post-truth does at the 
moment. 
So can truth be on the side of action? Can it disrupt the existing political space by 
introducing a new ethical and political dimension into it? This is exactly the question 
that Michel Foucault engages with in his discussion of the ancient Greek practice of 
parrësia, which means something like free and fearless speech. Ironically, Foucault is 
often considered – along with other ‘postmodern’ thinkers – as one of those 
responsible for our contemporary post-truth condition.27 It is often supposed that 
Foucault’s critique of the Enlightenment idea of a universally valid rational truth, and 
his notion instead of historically contingent and socially constructed ‘regimes of 
truth’, has contributed to a relativization of truth and therefore to the loss of 
epistemological certainty. Certainly, there are aspects of Foucault’s genealogical 
approach to truth, particularly during the 1970s – in which he saw truth as a kind of 
weapon deployed in struggles over power - that appear to chime with today’s picture 
of competing and antagonistic narratives and counter-narratives.28 However, 
Foucault’s subsequent work on the practices of the ‘care of the self’ in the cultures of 
Greek and Roman antiquity, and his late reconsideration of the Kantian 
Enlightenment as introducing an important ethos of permanent critique into 
modernity,29 takes a somewhat different approach to truth and attributes to it a greater 
value in interrogating power.  
Of central importance here is the ancient practice of parrësia, in which the truth-teller 
intervenes in politics by ‘speaking truth to power’. Often this intervention is 
unwelcome, and the activity of truth-telling carries great personal risk, as Plato 
discovered went he tried to give philosophical counsel to the Dionysus the tyrant of 
Syracuse. Like Arendt’s philosopher, the truth-teller stages a confrontation between a 
philosophical truth and political opinion and in so doing he embarks upon a dangerous 
enterprise. However, for Foucault, it is this absolute commitment to the truth – to 
speaking it and embodying it regardless of the risks – that makes the example of 
parrësia particularly interesting and important from an ethical and political point of 
view. Indeed, what gave parrësia its ethical quality was the element of courage 
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involved in taking such risks – it is the risk itself which commits the parrhesiast to 
truth of his words: ‘Parrësia is the free courage by which one binds oneself in the 
statement of the truth, of freely binding oneself to oneself in the form of a courageous 
act.’30 Parrësia is also a political activity - it intervenes in political affairs, often 
staging an agonistic confrontation not only with the singular will of the tyrant, but 
with the democratic will of the people – an opposition that became particularly acute 
in democratic Athens with the trial of Socrates. The parrhesiast is one who is prepared 
to go against the opinion of the majority, and to speak a singular truth against the 
demos, thus troubling and disrupting it.  
Indeed, as Foucault shows, this conflict reflects an internal contradiction within 
democracy between isëgoria, the equal right to speak and to exercise power given to 
all citizens, and parrësia, as the exercise of free and courageous speech, which is a 
more individualistic, singular, even ‘aristocratic’ principle – although it is not 
determined by status, implying instead an ethical differentiation that is irreducible to 
democratic equality and is often at odds with the democratic consensus.31 So while 
democracy is necessary for there to be parrësia, it also poses a threat to parrësia when 
the democratic will becomes intolerant of dissenting voices: ‘No true discourse 
without democracy, but true discourse introduces differences into democracy. No 
democracy without true discourse, but democracy threatens the very existence of true 
discourse.’32 True discourse, or parrësia, is therefore precisely the problem of 
government: if democracies are to be governed well, if democratic decision-making is 
to be guided effectively, then it must be exposed to the ordeal of truth, to an ethical 
principle which is always different to it, and which is at times in an antagonistic 
relationship with the democratic will. In directly contesting the political space and in 
assuming the danger of doing so, parrësia embodies genuine political commitment. 
Unlike the stable institutions of truth that Arendt spoke of, or the detached position of 
the philosopher, parrësia is a form of action, of truth as action, which has the potential 
to disrupt and change an existing situation. 
Ethical subjectivation and post-truth 
How might we think of parrësia today? There are of course numerous examples of 
dissenting speech in our contemporary world – from protests and occupations, to 
various forms of cyber dissidence, many of which carry enormous personal risk, even 
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within formally democratic societies. In contesting the public space, in defying the 
policies of elected governments, in sometimes going against the ‘will of the people’, 
contemporary parrhesiasts work to expand and deepen democracy precisely by 
interrogating it and reminding it of its ethical limitations. At the same time, Foucault 
shows that political parrësia in ancient Greece was in some respects a failure – which 
was why the practice went from being a political game to more of a philosophical 
game, retreating from the public space into the private realm of ascetic practices.33  
However, what I think is important to take from Foucault’s account of parrësia is the 
way that it works as a form of subjectivation. Indeed, Foucault sees it, along with 
ascesis, or ascetic practices, as one of the main forms of the ‘care of the self’ in 
antiquity, referring to an ethical problematic by which one attended to one’s 
behaviour, took responsibility for one’s actions, reflected upon and sought mastery 
over one’s desires, and moderated one’s relations with others. Self-knowledge was 
thus also a form of self-care, according to Foucault: ‘You must attend to yourself, you 
must not forget yourself, you must take care of yourself. The rule “know yourself” 
appears and is formulated within and at the forefront of this care.’34 This embodied a 
different relation to truth, to the truth of oneself, to that of the later Christian 
hermeneutics of the self in which one’s truth was a secret to be discovered in the 
context of relationships of monastic obedience – in the form of the confessional for 
instance - and later through the governing institutions of the Christian pastorate. 
Rather, the care of the self was not only a more autonomous set of practices, carried 
out by individuals in the company of others, outside of institutional settings, but was 
also a form of ethical self-constitution. Parrësia could be seen as precisely a form of 
self-constitution in this way because, in committing to the truth and freely assuming 
the risks involved, the individual formed a new relationship to himself: ‘parrësia is a 
way of opening up this risk linked to truth-telling by, as it were, constituting oneself 
as a partner of oneself when one speaks, by binding oneself to the statement of the 
truth and to the act of stating the truth.’35 How radically different does this relation to 
truth appear when compared to today’s post-truth paradigm, a condition characterised 
by the absolute lack of integrity, by what might be called ‘careless speech’.36 In 
contrast, parrësia might be considered a form of careful speech, not only in its 
commitment to truth – for which one is prepared to stake one’s life – but also in its 
concern for the integrity of the self.  
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Above all, for Foucault, the care of the self – of which parrësia is one of the central 
examples – was also a way of practicing freedom, of enhancing the autonomy of 
oneself and of others.37 To tend to one’s own freedom and to the freedom of others, 
one had to be master of one’s own passions and desires – including the desire to 
dominate and the desire to be dominated, which are two sides of the same coin. To do 
this one had to be able to exercise over oneself a certain discipline. If, as I believe, the 
prevalence of post-truth politics really depends on a kind of voluntary servitude, an 
abrogation of any responsibility to oneself and to one’s own freedom and integrity, 
and surrendering one’s own will to that of the master; if, put simply, post-truth only 
really works because people, out of laziness or resentment, are willing to believe its 
lies and allow themselves to be manipulated in this fashion – then perhaps what is 
needed is a new attitude towards truth, one in which a commitment to truth becomes 
at the same time a way of reclaiming one’s autonomy from power. To take a personal 
stake in truth – to see truth-telling and fearless speech as a exercise in freedom – as 
opposed to simply relying on institutions to safeguard it, might be one way of 
countering the post-truth condition and resisting the state of self-abandonment and 
ignominy it throws us into. 
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